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Abstract: There is something strange about the literature produced in the 
1990s by North American constitutional theorists on the relationship 
between constitutionalism and democracy. The problem, I believe, has two 
different roots: an excessive focus on the legitimacy of judicial review and 
an insistence in defending the constitutional status quo. On the one hand, 
the emphasis on judicial review usually ended up obscuring what should 
have been at the center of the debate: the way in which ordinary citizens 
could or not re-constitute the fundamental laws under which they lived. 
On the other, these approaches rarely involved recommendations for 
institutional changes (other than the occasional proposal for the abolition 
of judicial review) in the constitutional regimes they were operating. 
These 'happy endings' were particularly surprising, since one would think 
there must be many ways of upsetting the 'balance' between 
constitutionalism and democracy in favor of the latter. In fact, it would be 
astonishing that constitutional traditions which originated in an attempt to 
protect certain institutions from the passions of disorganized multitudes 
would not be wanting, even a bit, from the point of view of democracy. 
With these limited ends, it is no surprise that the constitutionalism-
democracy debate appears to have stagnated. 
This paper will advance a different approach to the debate, one that 
emphasizes popular participation in constitutional change and that 
recommends institutional transformations that would contribute to the 
realization of democracy in contemporary constitutional systems. I begin 
by reviewing the works of Ronald Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, and Bruce 
Ackerman. The take of these three authors on majority rule, judicial 
review, and constitutional amendments, exemplify very well the 
shortcomings of the literature on constitutionalism and democracy. The 
implications of Dworkin's constitutional theory are fatal for any 
democratic project: the prettification of a constitutional regime that is 
reputed to rest on the 'right' abstract principles. Waldron's approach, 
although attributing to 'the people' the right to have the constitution they 
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want, ends up identifying people and legislature, thus neglecting any 
actual participation of citizens in constitutional change. Ackerman's 
constitutional politics, although insisting in keeping citizens and 
representatives separate, replaces the flesh and blood human beings that 
live under the constitutional regime with a mythical 'People' (always with 
a capital P) whose acts are identified ex post facto. 
In contrast to these theories, I propose a conception of constitutionalism 
according to which the constitution should remain permanently open to 
important transformations. Under this 'weak' constitutionalism, there is no 
such thing as a 'good' or 'finished' constitution, contrary to what Dworkin's 
analysis implies. Only such a conception of constitutionalism, I believe, is 
consistent with a serious commitment to the democratic ideal. However, 
this supposes that democracy is not exhausted in legislatures and daily 
governance, but that it extends to deliberating and deciding on the very 
content of the constitution. In this respect, and in contrast to Waldron, I 
will defend a distinction between two dimensions of the democratic ideal: 
democracy at the level of daily governance and democracy at the level of 
the fundamental laws. By their very nature (daily vs. episodical), each of 
these dimensions demand different levels of popular engagement. Finally, 
I consider the institutional implications of this approach to the 
constitutionalism-democracy dilemma. Unlike Ackerman, I suggest a 
series of mechanisms designed to allow for the actual participation of 
ordinary citizens in the constitution and re-constitution of government. 
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There is something strange about the literature produced in the 1990s by 
North American constitutional theorists on the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy. The problem, I believe, has two 
different roots: an excessive focus on the legitimacy of judicial review and 
an insistence in defending the constitutional status quo. On the one hand, 
the emphasis on judicial review usually ended up obscuring what should 
have been at the center of the debate: the way in which ordinary citizens 
can or cannot re-constitute the constitution under which they live. On the 
other, these theorists rarely advanced recommendations for institutional 
changes in the constitutional regimes they were operating (other than the 
occasional proposal for the abolition of judicial review). These happy 
endings -in which constitutionalism and democracy were usually 
presented as two sides of the same coin- were particularly surprising, since 
one would think there must be many ways of upsetting the 'balance' 
between constitutionalism and democracy in favor of the latter. In fact, it 
would be astonishing that constitutional traditions which originated in an 
attempt to protect certain institutions from the passions of disorganized 
multitudes would not be wanting, even a bit, from the point of view of 
democracy. With these limited ends and inclinations, it is no surprise that 
the constitutionalism-democracy debate appears to have stagnated. 
 
It is tempting to say that behind the lack of recognition of any real 
conflicts between these two ideals and the absence of proposals directed 
toward an increase in the participation of citizens in the re-reproduction of 
the fundamental laws laid a profound fear of what could result from 
popular involvement in constitutional change. In other words, a mistrust in 
the ability of fellow citizens to engage in discussions of high principle, an 
insuperable attachment to the 'beauties' of judicial interpretation, and a 
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self-imposed responsibility to find arguments that support the less popular 
features of the established constitutional tradition. But this would be 
unfair: constitutional theorists engaged in the constitutionalism-democracy 
debate (including those whose work I will consider here) generally had an 
honest commitment to some version of the ideal of 'the rule of the people'.  
Perhaps the very framework of the debate prevented these theorists from 
assuming stronger democratic positions, even if in a few cases this attitude 
was the result of a political commitment to liberal constitutionalism pure 
and strong; its anti-populist splendor at its maximum. The actual reasons 
for this apparent deficit of democratic enthusiasm, however, is not what 
interests me here. Rather, my goal is to explore the main tendencies to the 
constitutionalism-democracy debate, identify its shortcomings, and build 
from there the basic contours of a decidedly and unrepentant democratic 
constitutional theory, one in which citizens have a real possibility of 
becoming protagonists of important constitutional transformations.   
 
Accordingly, this paper presents an approach to the constitutionalism-
democracy dilemma that emphasizes popular participation and considers 
some specific mechanisms that would contribute to the realization of 
democracy in contemporary constitutional systems. I begin with a short 
introduction to the dilemma and a brief account of the work of Ronald 
Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron, and Bruce Ackerman. The take of these three 
authors on majority rule, judicial review, and constitutional amendments, 
exemplify very well what I believe are the three main tendencies in the 
literature on constitutionalism and democracy.i The implications of 
Dworkin's constitutional theory are fatal for any democratic project: the 
prettification of a constitutional regime that is reputed to rest on the 'right' 
abstract principles. Waldron's approach, although attributing to 'the people' 
the right to have the constitution they want, ends up identifying people and 
legislature, thus neglecting any actual participation of citizens in 
constitutional change. Ackerman's constitutional politics aims at keeping 
citizens and representatives separate, but at the price of replacing the flesh 
and blood human beings that live under the constitutional regime with a 
mythical 'People' (always with a capital P) whose acts are  to be identified 
ex post facto. 
 
In contrast to these theories, I propose a conception of constitutionalism 
according to which the constitution should remain permanently open to 
democratic transformations. Under this 'weak' constitutionalism, there is 
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no such thing as a 'good' or 'finished' constitution (which might evolve 
through constitutional interpretation, but whose provisions must be 
insulated from democratic majorities), contrary to what Dworkin's analysis 
implies.  Only such a conception of constitutionalism, when accompanied 
by a strong democracy, is consistent with a serious commitment to the 
democratic ideal. However, this supposes that democracy is not exhausted 
in legislatures and daily governance, but that it extends to deliberating and 
deciding on the very content of the constitution. In this respect, and in 
contrast to Waldron, I will defend a distinction between democracy at the 
level of daily governance and democracy at the level of the fundamental 
laws. By their very nature (daily vs. episodical), each of these dimensions 
demand and allow different levels of popular engagement. Finally, I 
consider some of the institutional implications of my approach to the 
constitutionalism-democracy dilemma. Unlike Ackerman, I suggest a 
series of mechanisms designed to allow for the actual participation of 
ordinary citizens in the constitution and re-constitution of government. 
These mechanisms include constituent assemblies convened 'from below' 
and popular initiatives to amend the constitution, institutions already 
present in some constitutional regimes. Although an important part of the 
paper is devoted to the examination and critique of the work of three 
American authors, my substantive proposals are not directed toward any 
specific country. They are, rather, examples of ways in which 
constitutionalism might be 'democratized', and in that respect, invitations 
to move the constitutionalism-democracy debate to more strongly 
democratic grounds. 
 
 
I. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
 
The constitutionalism-democracy dilemma, the idea that constitutionalism 
and democracy are in tension (or in conflict) which each other, is not only 
a matter of constitutional theory. In fact, this problem has been the object 
of judicial treatment in several cases which, in one way or another, 
touched upon the fundamental principles of the juridical order in question. 
In North America, one of these cases is the Secession Reference, where 
the Supreme Court of Canada considered the question of the unilateral 
secession of Quebec.ii In an attempt to balance democratic and 
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constitutional principles, the court held that the Canadian constitution 
(which does not contain a provision allowing provinces to secede from 
Canada) could not be legitimately circumvented even if a majority of 
Quebeckers voted in favor of secession. According to the court, the 
Canadian conception of democracy is not a mere system of majority rule 
but, taken in conjunction with other constitutional principles, involves the 
idea “that the political representatives of the people of a province have the 
capacity and the power to commit to be bound into the future by the 
constitutional rules being adopted”iii. In this sense, far from negating 
democracy, constitutionalism creates an orderly framework that allows 
people to make political decisions: “Viewed correctly, constitutionalism 
and the rule of law are not in conflict with democracy; rather, they are 
essential to it”iv. 
 
One year later, the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela examined a 
similar issue. The case before the Supreme Court did not involve the 
secession of a political unit from a federation, but the creation of a new 
constitutional regime through a procedure not contemplated by the 
constitution's amendment rule. The controversy originated when the then 
recently installed government called for a referendum that asked the 
Venezuelan electorate whether they wanted to convene a constituent 
assembly in order to re-constitute the republic. The amendment procedure 
of the 1961 Constitution, however, placed the amending power exclusively 
in the ordinary legislature. Not surprisingly, many jurists argued that to 
convene a constituent assembly was contrary to the established juridical 
order and would require a previous constitutional amendment. In a 
decision that accepted the existence of a tension between constitutionalism 
and democracy, the court held that the limits established in the constitution 
regarding the Congress’ power of amendment applied only to that body 
and not to the people in the exercise of their constituent power.v  
 
The decisions of these two courts, operating in different contexts and in 
countries with dissimilar political histories, exemplify with unsuspected 
clarity one of the basic problems of constitutional theory: democrats 
finding in constitutions a nuisance and constitutionalists perceiving 
democracy as a threat.vi A preliminary overview of the central 
characteristics of these two ideals suffices to show why. Democracy, in the 
most traditional sense, is about self-government. Its basic idea is that 
citizens themselves decide the content of the laws that organize their 
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political association and regulate their conduct.vii This supposes not only 
popular participation in the constitution of government, but that there can 
be no fixed law, that is, a law that has to be taken for granted and that is 
not -or should not be- subject to revision. A democratic regime is a regime 
in which citizens not only adopt ordinary and fundamental laws, but can 
also change them: a system that remains open to democratic 
transformations. These democratic features (which I will elaborate later) 
appear to be contradicted by constitutionalism in two related but not 
identical ways. First, constitutionalism seeks to limit the kinds of laws that 
can be created by legislative majorities, a limit that is usually 
institutionalized through the adoption of judicial review of legislation. 
Second, and as part of a general concern with constitutional stability and 
supremacy, constitutionalism also places limits on the faculty of citizens 
to alter the fundamental law; it mandates a constitution that can only be 
altered with difficulty, usually by legislative supermajorities.  As I will 
argue below, the solutions given by Dworkin, Waldron, and Ackerman to 
this apparent conflict are too deferential of constitutionalism and, as a 
result, come short of giving democracy its due.viii 
 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALISM AS DEMOCRACY SOLUTION 
 
Through his career, Ronald Dworkin has insisted that the alleged tension 
between constitutionalism and democracy is the result of a 
misunderstanding and exaggeration. In his view, those who maintain that 
there is something undemocratic about constitutionalism fail to understand 
what democracy is really about.ix It is true, he says, that democracy means 
government by the people, but the majoritarianism defended by some 
democrats is simply based on a mistaken conception.x Such a view cannot 
explain what is good about democracy, incorrectly assuming that the mere 
weight of numbers, on its own, contributes something of value to a 
political decision.xi The correct understanding of the ideal of the 'rule by 
the people' is to be found in what he calls the 'constitutional conception' of 
democracy (and more recently the 'partnership view')xii. Not surprisingly, 
this view rejects the majoritarian premise and replaces it with a result 
oriented view of democracy: “that collective decisions be made by 
political institutions whose structure, composition, and practices treat all 
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members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and 
respect”xiii.  
 
This means that democracy is about protecting individual rights, because 
they are the rights that will guarantee that the state treats (or abstain from 
treating) citizens in certain ways. It is easy to see how Dworkin derives a 
defense of judicial review of legislation from this approach: if the decision 
of a court strikes down a statute adopted by a legislative majority (or by 
the unanimous vote of the population for that matter) because it violates 
individual rights, there is no loss to democracy but a democratic victory. 
When one translates this view into the language of constitutional law and 
into a specific type of constitution, Dworkin's solution to the 
constitutionalism-democracy dilemma can be seen more clearly. For him, 
a constitution serves democratic ends insofar as it contains the right 
abstract principles. Who created the constitution, who is allowed to change 
it and how is secondary: the democratic credentials of a country’s 
fundamental laws depend not on when or by whom those laws were made, 
but on their content.xiv   
 
Thus, for example, if the fundamental laws provide for “more-or-less 
popularly accountable day-to-day government based on a more-or-less 
equally distributed franchise; for non-discriminatory law making and 
prohibition of caste distinctions; for protection against arbitrary and 
oppressive uses of state powers; [and] for strong rights of moral 
autonomy…”, we have a democratic regime.xv  Understood in this way, 
democracy is not only compatible with the disabling provisions of a 
traditional liberal constitution, but is identified with the existence of those 
provisions. Dworkin, as a good constitutionalist, would not want a 
constitution that contains the right content to be easily changed, so he 
defends a difficult and state-driven amendment procedure. In his view, the 
kind of constitution necessary for democracy is identical to the one 
required by constitutionalism: one that contains certain rights, that sets 
limits to popular decision making, and that cannot be easily altered.xvi  His 
preferred constitution promises permanency to the principles and 
institutions that it protects, whose scope and meaning is to be determined 
by judges. According to Dworkin, there is no conflict whatsoever between 
constitutionalism and democracy, because if one looks closely, they are 
really one and the same.  
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B. THE LEGISLATURE AS THE PEOPLE SOLUTION 
 
Some readers will be surprised to see Jeremy Waldron's name included in 
a group of scholars whose work is supposedly wanting from a democratic 
perspective. After all, Waldron has denounced, together with a radical 
democrat like Roberto Mangabeira Unger, the dirty little secret of 
contemporary jurisprudence: its discomfort with democracy.xvii Shouldn't 
Waldron's  focus on popular participation, his defense of legislatures, and 
his sustained attack against judicial review, be enough to satisfy even the 
most recalcitrant democrat? For this author the democratic character of 
laws depends on who made them and by what procedures they came into 
existence, and he appears to leave no space for constitutionalism's 
insistence on legal limits to popular decision-making. The problem is that 
Waldron does not take his democratic instincts far enough, that popular 
participation does not mean much if it is thought to take place inside a 
parliament.  And in his procedural conception of democracy this is 
precisely what happens.  
 
For Waldron, people have a right to participate in equal terms in all 
aspects of their community’s governance, that is, not just in interstitial 
matters of social and economic policy but also in social decisions of high 
principle.xviii The very idea of rights is based on a view of the rights-bearer 
as a thinking agent, someone who is capable of moral deliberation and of 
transcending personal interest, and this involves giving a special place to 
the right to participate in all aspects of the community's governance.xix  
This does not mean that the right to participate has moral priority over 
other rights, but that when there is disagreement about what rights people 
have or about what those rights entail (and disagreement about rights is 
simply inevitable), the exercise of the right to participation is the most 
appropriate for settling the dispute.xx This is another way of saying that 
there cannot be a democracy unless the demos has the last word on 
important political decisions, and that “the people or their representatives” 
determine (using majority-rule as a decision-making method)xxi the 
principles of their association and the content of their laws.xxii  
 
This approach is of course incompatible with judicial review of legislation, 
which gives the judiciary the power to trump the decisions of the majority. 
Even if Waldron agrees with Dworkin on key questions of political 
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morality (such as abortion or the death penalty) he thinks that legislatures, 
as the duly representatives of the people, are the ones to deliberate and 
provide an answer to these questions: “In countries that do not allow 
legislation to be invalidated in this way [through judicial review], the 
people themselves can decide finally, by ordinary legislative procedures, 
whether they want to permit abortion, affirmative action, school vouchers, 
or gay marriage”xxiii. Accordingly, a system that gives the citizens or their 
representatives (notice here Waldron’s problematic identification of 
people and legislature)xxiv the power to decide what will be the content and 
scope of constitutional guarantees is potentially a true and complete 
democratic victory. Thus, the tension between constitutionalism and 
democracy is nothing but a product of the limits imposed by judicial 
review on a democratically elected legislature. If the power to impose 
these limits is abolished, the tension between constitutionalism and 
democracy would disappear.  
 
C. THE PEOPLE AS 'THE PEOPLE' SOLUTION 
 
Bruce Ackerman’s constitutional theory is very well known and has been 
the object of many discussions and critiques. Although focused in the U.S. 
constitutional tradition, I think it is possible to extend his theory to other 
liberal democracies. Ackerman’s central claim emerges from the idea that 
the United States has a dualist constitution. By that, he means that the 
constitution seeks to distinguish between two different kinds of decisions: 
(a) decisions by the government; and (b) decisions by ‘the people’.xxv 
Ackerman identifies the former as normal politics and the latter as 
constitutional politics. These latter periods of higher law making conform 
the ‘highest kind of politics’, the moments in which ‘We the People’ speak 
without being restrained by pre-established constitutional forms. Because 
of its extraordinary character, constitutional politics should be permitted to 
take place only during the rare moments of what Ackerman calls 
“heightened political consciousness”xxvi.    
  
During times of normal politics, in contrast, it is only the government who 
speaks. Political representation must be seen with suspicion, and the 
actions of the legislature should not be mistaken for the genuine voice of 
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‘We the People Assembled’.xxvii The idea is that the legislative and 
executive powers merely represent the people in a manner of speaking, 
“each is a metaphor that should never be confused with the way the People 
express their will during those rare periods of constitutional politics when 
the mass of American citizens mobilizes itself in a collective effort to 
renew and redefine the public good”xxviii. Ackerman is easily able to derive 
a defense of judicial review from this conception: because ordinary 
representatives are only ‘stand-ins’ for the People, they might attempt to 
jeopardize the fundamental laws created during moments of constitutional 
politics. The role of judicial review is precisely to protect the 
achievements of the People during those extraordinary episodes: “Until a 
constitutional movement successfully amends our higher law, the Court’s 
task is to preserve the People’s judgments against their erosion by normal 
lawmaking”xxix.  
 
This author's approach to the constitutionalism-democracy dilemma is 
quite different from that of Dworkin and Waldron. For him, 
constitutionalism and democracy are neither about the protection of 
individual rights through judicial review nor about parliamentary 
supremacy: they are about preventing ordinary politicians from taking the 
place of the People. In fact, he rejects both 'right foundationalism' (the 
idea that the first and foremost concern of the constitution is to protect 
rights, even if this means invalidating the decisions taken by democratic 
institutions)xxx and 'monism' (the idea of granting plenary making 
authority to the winners of the last election).xxxi Instead, he urges us to 
distinguish between decisions made by the People and decisions made by 
the legislature, and as goods democrats, to accept that the former should 
take precedence over the latter. However, his approach is not about 
providing ways for ordinary citizens to participate in constitutional 
change, but about the ways in which government might be able to get the 
support of We the People and speak in its name. Solving the tension 
between constitutionalism and democracy, then, does not require any 
major institutional transformations (as constitutionalism does not place 
any limits on dualist democracy’s People), but theorists that, sensible to 
dualist democracy, are able to discern between constitutional and normal 
politics. 
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II. A DEMOCRATIC APPROACH TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM-DEMOCRACY DEBATE 
 
The previous review of Dworkin's, Waldron's, and Ackerman's 
contributions to the constitutionalism-democracy debate hinted on what I 
think are some of the democratic shortcomings of these author's proposals. 
Dworkin and Ackerman are perfect apologists of the constitutional status 
quo: according to them, there is a way of understanding the prevailing 
'balance' between constitutionalism and democracy that cherishes and 
respects the democratic ideal. And while Waldron sees a problem in some 
contemporary constitutional regimes, it is a problem which is solved by 
the abolition of the institution of judicial review of legislation. However, 
as will become clear later, regardless of the position one takes on the 
democratic or undemocratic character of giving judges the power to strike 
down ordinary laws, one will still come short of advancing a truly 
democratic project if arguing in favor or against this institution is all one 
does. Democracy is of course inconsistent with permanent constitutions 
and appeals to a People that acts in mysterious ways, but it is not 
exhausted by parliamentary supremacy either. It is, on the contrary, a 
much richer ideal, and if the constitutionalism-democracy debate is to be 
taken to another level the approaches represented in the work of these 
three authors must be subject to a democratic critique, one that defends a 
strong and participatory conception of democracy.xxxii  
 
In this section of the paper I will confront the proposals of these three 
authors with an alternative approach. Against Dworkin, I will argue that 
the constitutional conception is in conflict with democratic openness (the 
idea that all laws, including fundamental ones, must be permanently open 
to important transformations through highly democratic procedures). 
Democratic openness, together with popular participation, is one of the 
basic components of the democratic ideal. Against Waldron, I maintain 
that there is more to democracy and popular participation than 
majoritarian decision making inside legislatures: democracy has a second 
dimension that asks us to look at the ways ordinary citizens can change the 
fundamental laws. Finally, against Ackerman, I argue that a genuinely 
democratic constitutional change mandates the actual participation of 
citizens in constitutional politics, which is quite different from getting the 
support of the People or being able to speak in its name.  
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A. DEMOCRATIC OPENNESS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCEPTION 
 
What Dworkin' constitutional conception of democracy does is to set the 
traditional content of a liberal constitution as democracy's precondition. 
Under this view, democracy is exhausted by the right content; the only 
objective of such a conception is to ensure the protection of an 
‘exemplary’ constitution, a constitution whose provisions meet Dworkin 
standards. In fact, the very idea of ordinary people meddling with the 
content of a 'good' constitution is a threat to this conception of democracy, 
and that is why Dworkin favors an amendment procedure that makes 
constitutional change difficult and unlikely. For him, majorities should not 
be allowed, “whenever they wish, to change the basic constitutional 
structure that seems best calculated to ensure equal concern”xxxiii. Put in a 
different way, under the constitutional conception, there could be a 
democracy under a ‘given’ constitution. That is to say, someone (say a 
group of Western experts) writes a constitution that provides for an 
elective legislative assembly and the protection of traditional liberal rights 
and tells a group of people: ‘here is your democratic constitution, now 
follow it (but don't change it) and govern yourselves ‘democratically’’. 
 
Contrary to what Dworkin believes, this approach is in clear and direct 
conflict with democracy, as it negates one of the basic components of this 
ideal. It is true that democracy is one of the most contested terms of our 
political culture, and that it is far from clear what it requires in the context 
of large and complex societies. However, there are some basic ideas that 
are inherent to the principle of ‘the rule by the people’ (democracy’s 
specific and literal meaning).xxxiv Once one begins to depart from these 
ideas democracy quickly becomes something else. One of these ideas is 
that a democratic society is an open society, that is, one in which even the 
most fundamental principles are open for discussion and are always 
susceptible of being reformulated or replaced. Democratic openness 
welcomes conflict and dissent, and it is incompatible with untouchable 
abstract principles. To paraphrase Castoriadis, a democratic society is “not 
a society that has adopted just laws, once and for all, rather is a society 
where the question of justice remains constantly open”.xxxv 
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The conception of an open society is directly related to the principle of the 
‘rule by the people’ in one fundamental sense. To say that the people rule 
themselves is to say that they are a ‘self-governing’ people: a group of 
human beings that come together as political equals and give themselves 
the laws that will regulate their conduct and the institutions under which 
they live.  This involves two important and related points. First, for these 
rules to be the people’s own, it must be today’s people who rule, not past 
generations or political philosophers, however wise or well-intentioned 
their act of constitution-making was, or whatever the content of the 
provisions they adopted. The idea of pre-commitment (perfectly attuned to 
the logic of constitutionalism) cannot be brought to a final reconciliation 
with democracy.xxxvi  Second, for there to be democratic self-rule, no rule 
can be taken for granted or removed from critique and revision.xxxvii A 
self-governing people must be able to reformulate their commitments 
democratically. In this sense, the idea of placing stringent requirements for 
constitutional amendments, or of placing part of the constitutional text 
outside the scope of democratic politics, is in clear tension with the ideal 
of democratic openness and with the very idea of the rule by the people.  
As Claude Lefort has put it, democracy allows “no law that can be fixed, 
whose articles cannot be contested, whose foundations are not susceptible 
of being called into question”xxxviii.  
 
Dworkin's approach, in which there is such a thing as a constitution that 
contains the right abstract principles, negates democratic openness in 
important ways. His conception of democracy is perfectly consistent with 
a finished constitution: a constitution that might be improved by correcting 
some historical mistakes here and there (through judicial 
interpretation)xxxix, but whose fundamental principles and the 
governmental structure it creates should not be susceptible to change by 
highly democratic procedures.xl If a constitution contains the right abstract 
principles (the rights and institutions that promote equal concern and 
respect) and if judges are allow to interpret and re-interpret its provisions, 
why should we be concerned about how it came into existence, or why 
would someone ever want to re-write its fundamental provisions? 
Dworkin's solution to the constitutionalism-democracy dilemma might 
promote the production of ‘good’ laws (under his standards), but it is 
much more about keeping constitutionalism untouched than about 
realizing democracy. Now, it is true that to say that in a democracy 
everything is open for replacement is to accept that democracy always 
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involves the risk of replacing itself. Democracy, there should be no doubt 
about it, is always a risk, but a risk that a democrat -if she wishes to 
remain a democrat- has no choice but to accept.  To do otherwise would 
mean sacrificing the creativity of ordinary people together with the 
possibilities of creating more just societies for the fear of a citizenry that, 
through highly participatory and inclusive procedures, is willing to give up 
the very institutions that make their self-government possible.xli  
 
B. THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND PARLIAMENTARY 
SUPREMACY 
 
Unlike Dworkin, Waldron takes seriously the ideal of democratic 
openness. For him, the meaning and scope of every constitutional 
provision (if there happens to be a written constitution), should be 
determined by the elected legislature, not by a group of judges. I believe 
that Waldron's approach is democratically superior to that of Dworkin's. It 
has, however, an important limitation: it only seems to conceive 
democratic openness in the context of what I will call the first dimension 
of democracy (democratic governance). If the legislature and the people 
are identified with each other (as in Waldron) the actual role of the latter 
in debating and reformulating the basic principles of the constitutional 
regime will be quite limited, to say the least. It should be clear that this is 
not an argument against representative democracy, but an argument that 
points to a (second) dimension of democracy (democracy at the level of 
the fundamental laws) in which ordinary representative institutions should 
give way to more participatory mechanisms. Democratic openness must be 
an openness accessible to ordinary citizens, not confined to the four walls 
of a legislature. In this section I will distinguish between these two 
dimensions of the democratic ideal and argue that Waldron's conception 
(like most theories that focus in the legitimacy of judicial review) operate 
exclusively in the domain of democratic governance. 
 
When people say that a certain country is ‘democratic’ they are usually 
referring to democracy at the level of governance. That is, they are saying 
that that country’s laws and institutions provide for frequent elections, that 
citizens are allowed to associate in different organizations (including 
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political parties) and to express their political opinions without fear of 
punishment. In short, they are making the observation that the country in 
question satisfies the requirements of what Robert Dahl has identified as 
polyarchy.xlii In this sense, democratic governance has to do with the daily 
workings of a state’s juridical apparatus and with the processes that result 
in the adoption of the ordinary laws and policies. For instance, an 
unelected upper house (like the Canadian Senate) and the debate over 
districting in countries such as the United States are problems of 
democratic governance, as well as issues like the restriction of campaign 
finances, the legitimacy of judicial review, proportional representation, 
and the equal treatment of citizens by a state bureaucratic apparatus. In 
this respect, democratic governance is also related in important ways with 
the content of the fundamental laws: Does the constitution provide for 
universal suffrage? Does it establish an elected legislature? Does it respect 
basic liberties? If in the context of a particular constitutional regime 
questions like these are to be answer in the negative, democratic 
governance would be impossible. 
 
The second dimension of democracy deals with other questions. It is not 
about the daily workings of the state’s political apparatus, but about the 
relation of the people to their constitution. It does not focus on the 
adoption or content of ordinary laws or on who should have the final word 
to interpret existent constitutional provisions, but on how constitutional 
regime came into existence and how it can be altered. These are questions 
about the ways in which citizens can participate in constitution-making 
and constitutional reform and, as I stated in the introduction, I think they 
should be the natural focus of the constitutionalism-democracy debate. 
With regards to constitution-making, the second dimension of democracy 
is incompatible with ‘given’ constitutions, regardless of how liberal or 
wise their content might be:  the (democratic) constitution-maker should 
not find any principles already sedimented into the future constitutional 
regime. In the context of constitutional reform, democracy is incompatible 
with the idea of a constitution that, reputed to contain the right abstract 
principles, should never be meddled with. When important juridical 
transformations are needed, it mandates a process that attempts to 
reproduce a democratic constitution-making episode. Because the exercise 
of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws is episodical by nature, 
it is more compatible with extraordinary and highly participatory 
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processes which are difficult or impossible to put in practice at a daily 
level.xliii 
 
While Waldron's approach is more consistent with democracy than that of 
Dworkin's, both authors proceed as if democratic governance enclosed all 
forms of democratic politics. Waldron limits himself to give to the 
legislative assembly what he takes away from the judiciary, rendering the 
actual participation of citizens in framing the content of the fundamental 
laws unnecessary. His assertion that every time there is a disagreement 
about rights “the people whose rights are in question have the right to 
participate on equal terms in that decision”xliv does not mean much if an 
ordinary legislature will do all the work and the only role of the citizens is 
that of electing legislators every few years. Waldron might not actually 
think that democracy can be exhausted in a legislature, but his defense of 
parliamentary supremacy and of the right to participate has nothing to say 
about democracy at the level of the fundamental laws. To be fair to 
Waldron, one might say that his approach does not exclude an account of 
the second dimension of democracy, and that, in fact, it would be entirely 
compatible with it. But this is precisely my critique: that his solution to the 
constitutionalism-democracy dilemma, which involves a problematic 
identification of people and legislature, operates only within the realm of 
democratic governance. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Waldron 
never addresses the fact that there might be more democratic and 
participatory procedures for taking important decisions than the simple 
rule of legislative majorities, especially for altering the content of the 
constitution and expanding (or limiting) the scope of fundamental rights. 
 
C. POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
 
Ackerman avoids some of the problems that characterize Dworkin's and 
Waldron's approaches. First, his theory expressly rejects the 'rights 
foundationalism' of Dworkin and explicitly embraces democratic 
openness: the People should be able to change the constitution in whatever 
form it wishes, even in ways that circumvent the formal amendment 
procedure. Second, Ackerman rejects Waldron's 'monism', clearly 
distinguishing the People from the legislature. Failing to make this 
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distinction, he thinks, is to misunderstand America’s dualist democracy. 
Although Ackerman's theory has important similarities with the distinction 
between the two dimensions of democracy, it has an important and 
decisive difference: it does not tell us if constitutional politics require the 
actual participation of citizens in important constitutional transformations, 
other than expressing their assent for change. Even if the periods of 
constitutional politics he identifies in American history were characterized 
by mass mobilizations (which is by no means clear), they were mostly 
driven by political elites.  Ackerman’s take on popular participation in 
constitutional reform is mainly about getting the support of the People, 
about being able to speak in the People’s name. Constitutional politics is a 
complex process that involves Congress, the Executive, and the Supreme 
Court, and in which ordinary citizens only play the minor role of 
expressing their support for change (in regular elections in particular).xlv   
 
In other words, his conception of constitutional politics does not come 
accompanied by mechanisms that would increase the participation of 
citizens (like constituent assemblies convened 'from below' and popular 
initiatives) in re-constituting the juridical system. The problem, of course, 
is that the maximization of popular participation is, together with 
democratic openness, one of the basic components of the democratic ideal. 
That democracy mandates popular participation in the production of all 
laws is almost axiomatic. Democratic self-government not only entails a 
“community of citizens -the demos- [that] proclaims that it is absolutely 
sovereign” (e.g. the ideal of democratic openness); it also involves an 
affirmation of the “equal sharing of activity and power” of all citizens.xlvi 
Democracy means ‘rule by the people’, and the people who invented it, 
the Greeks, institutionalized this very definition in their juridical 
arrangements. The most famous example is the 5th century Athenian 
assembly, which was open to all male, adult, and free citizensxlvii and met 
more than forty times a year.xlviii This institution rested on the premise that 
common people were not only competent to elect their governors, but to 
make political judgments about substantive issues.xlix  
 
This is also how eighteenth century revolutionaries in Europe and the 
United States understood democracy: as the rule of everyone by everyone.l 
Modern critics, such as Jean Bodinli and Adam Fergusonlii, also 
understood it in this way, and it is also why they opposed it.liii For them, 
popular participation was by its very nature problematic: it necessarily 
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included granting political power to the lower classes of society and that 
was considered by itself a very good reason for discomfort. The American 
Federalists were also in this ‘group’ and were not shy to show their fear of 
democracy. For instance, James Madison warned that “[pure] democracies 
have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been 
found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and 
have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in 
their deaths”liv. The Federalists not only understood democracy as 
requiring popular participation, but offered ‘representative democracy’ as 
an alternative.lv Madison even argued that the voice of the representatives 
would be “more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the 
people themselves, convened for the purpose”lvi, and at some points 
seemed to recommend a large federation (as opposed to a confederation of 
autonomous entities) in order to make the kind of representative system he 
favored necessary.lvii For both the Greeks and modern critics of 
democracy, the meaning and practical implications of this ideal were 
reasonably clear: democracy meant rule by the people and it required the 
adoption of institutions that would result in the participation of all citizens 
-to the extent possible- in all aspects of the activity of governing. For them 
the rule of the people extended to all matters (which is why popular 
participation represented a threat), including the creation and re-creation 
of the fundamental laws; no issue was to be removed from the democratic 
process. 
 
It is not difficult to understand why popular participation is a basic 
component of democracy: it respects the equality of all citizens, 
recognizing their capacity to govern themselves by engaging in 
discussions about fundamental substantive issues. A process of 
constitutional change lead by experts or political elites expresses a 
discomfort with democratic self-government, suggesting that some people 
are better equipped to decide what is best for everyone. Popular 
participation, however, has been moved to a secondary plane by many 
influential accounts of democracy.lviii The usual argument for this move is 
that, no matter how desirable, the maximization of popular participation is 
not possible in large and complex societies. That, however, might be true 
with respect to democracy at the level of daily governance (and in fact that 
is the focus of those theories), but not with respect to episodes of 
constitutional change. As such, any democratic theory of constitutional 
change must engage in the production of proposals directed at increasing 
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the role of ordinary citizens in the production of constitutional norms.  A 
constitutional theory that does not make such an effort, but instead focuses 
on the production of arguments directed at showing that despite all 
evidence to the contrary democracy reigns in liberal constitutional 
regimes, hardly deserves the label 'democratic'.  Unfortunately, Ackerman 
does present neither arguments nor proposals for an increase in popular 
participation, unless one understands popular participation to be exhausted 
in the actions of a government that claims to act with the support of ‘We 
the People’. Thus, while doing away with Waldron's identification of 
people and legislature, Ackerman proceeds in a highly theoretical way, 
without attempting to provide ways for flesh and blood human beings to 
directly deliberate and decide about the content of their constitution.  
 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE  
 
Each of the approaches to the constitutionalism-democracy dilemma 
considered in this paper suffers from an important democratic deficit. It is 
nevertheless possible to retrieve some democratic lessons from each. First, 
Dworkin's emphasis on rights reminds us that regardless of the limitations 
that some rights impose on popular decision-making, there is an important 
connection between democracy and rights. That is, there are some rights 
(such as freedom of association, the right to vote, and freedom of 
expression) without which any meaningful democratic exercise would be 
close to impossible. Second, Waldron's rejection of judicial review points 
toward an inescapable consequence of any democratic constitutional 
theory: important decisions should be, at the very least, in the hands of 
elected institutions. Third, Ackerman's dualist theory forces us to see that 
there is more to democracy than what happens inside parliaments, and that 
democratic constitutional change does not always take place through  
ordinary procedures. If one wants to construct a democratic constitutional 
theory, however, these insights will not do: it is necessary to push 
constitutionalism toward democracy instead of pulling democracy closer 
to it, to upset the 'balance' between these ideals in favor of the latter. This 
is precisely what the rest of the paper attempts to do: to move 
constitutionalism toward a terrain in which citizens, not untouchable 
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principles, rule. In this next and final part of the paper I will consider the 
institutional implications of the previous critique and advance a set of 
substantive proposals. 
 
A. WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM  
 
Constitutional democracy is the dominant theory (defended, in different 
degrees and emphasis, by Dworkin, Waldron, and Ackerman) about what 
should be the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, an 
attempt to balance these two ideals. But it is neither the only theory nor 
the only balance. It is possible to develop a conception of 
constitutionalism that is more sensitive to the ideals of popular 
participation and democratic openness. I call this conception weak 
constitutionalism, which serves as the backbone of the proposals that I will 
introduce in the next two sections. Weak constitutionalism, to use Unger’s 
phrase, sees the constitution as “the creation and property of a free and 
democratic people”lix, not as the exclusive domain of jurists and experts. 
Because it takes seriously the idea of democracy at the level of the 
fundamental laws, it does not perceive an active citizenry as a threat (even 
when its actions might result in the destruction of the established 
constitution and the emergence of a new one) but as the possibility of 
correcting existing injustices. Unlike the traditional version of 
constitutionalism, it does not see the liberal constitution as the incarnation 
of just and universal principles. On the contrary, by taking constitutions as 
what they inevitably are -the creation of human beings and the result of 
political struggle- it recognizes the necessity of keeping the constitutional 
regime open, or what is the same thing, the political terrain never closed. 
In what follows, I outline the basic premises of a theory of weak 
constitutionalism.  
 
First, weak constitutionalism does not see constituent power (the power to 
create and re-create constitutional regimes)lx as a threat. Unlike Dworkin's 
conception of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, it 
does not maintain the precedence of the constitutional forms over the 
constituent power of the people. It rests on the idea that there is a 
permanent and juridically unsolvable tension between the constitution and 
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the political power under which it rests. Instead of privileging the 
supremacy of the constitutional forms through a constitution that is 
difficult or impossible to change, it recognizes the constitution as higher 
law while leaving the door open for constituent power's future re-
emergence. By so doing, weak constitutionalism does not seek to resolve 
this tension. On the contrary, it recognizes it as an inevitable consequence 
of having a constitution and makes it even more obvious by giving citizens 
the institutional means for acting together and take precedence over the 
constitutional text, even if only episodically. Put differently, it allows for 
the distinction between democratic governance and democracy at the level 
of the fundamental laws to assume a real and practical meaning.  
 
Second, weak constitutionalism comes accompanied by the idea, absent in 
Waldron's approach, that important constitutional transformations should 
not be the work of ordinary institutions. These institutions are designed to 
operate at the level of daily governance, where the maximization of 
popular participation is not possible. Weak constitutionalism is not about a 
constitution that, just like ordinary law, can be easily changed by 
democratic majorities if the term ‘democratic majorities’ simply refers to a 
majority of state officials sitting in a legislature.lxi When an important 
constitutional transformation is needed, it recommends that changes to the 
constitution be made through an exercise of popular participation similar 
to that present when the constitution was adopted in the first place (which 
does not necessarily mean that it will be easier to alter the constitutional 
text, but that the process for altering it must be highly participatory). The 
issue here is not simply one of representative versus direct democracy. 
Popular participation cannot be limited to a process in which experts draft 
the constitutional text and then submit it to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote in a 
referendum; it involves a process in which citizens are allowed to propose, 
debate, and decide on the content of their constitution.  
 
Third, weak constitutionalism rests on a participatory conception of the 
citizen. The citizen is not seen merely as a human being with rights that 
participates in politics through the election of officials every four of five 
years, but as someone who is allowed to take part of the (re)positing of the 
norms that govern the state. In other words, a citizen is someone who 
participates (not in Ackerman's sense but through actual extraordinary 
mechanisms) in the democratic legitimation of the constitutional regime 
and knows that, despite all the imperfections of such an order, it can be 
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changed.lxii Not only this conception of the citizen is more consistent with 
democracy but it might result in citizens developing a sense of 
identification with the constitutional regime, seeing the constitution as 
theirs, as their work-in-progress and not simply as the embodiment of the 
collective will of a mysterious People.lxiii When important constitutional 
transformations are needed, this active citizenry engages in different forms 
of political participation in order to create the political climate necessary 
for extraordinary mechanisms to be activated. The paradigmatic 
institutions of weak constitutionalism are the constituent assembly 
convened 'from below' and the popular initiative to amend the 
constitution, which I consider in the next two sections of this paper. 
Different versions of these institutions are already present in some 
constitutional regimes. I present them here as mechanisms that a few 
polities have adopted in order to ease the tension between 
constitutionalism and democracy and as examples of the types of 
proposals for change that a new wave of the constitutionalism-democracy 
debate should focus on.  
 
B. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLIES CONVENED 'FROM BELOW' 
 
Constituent assemblies are usually convened for the adoption of a new 
constitution or for a complete constitutional overhaul. In their 'democratic 
variant'lxiv they are composed of directly elected delegates who have the 
responsibility of drafting a new constitution or a set of amendments to an 
already existing one (which are to be accepted or rejected by the electorate 
in a referendum). The extraordinary power of these bodies is usually 
defended through an appeal to their highly participatory and deliberative 
nature. Ideally, such an assembly is convened in an episode of intense 
popular mobilization for the specific task of altering the constitutional 
regime, elected in a way that maximizes the participation of all sectors of 
society (this is why some form of proportional representation is usually 
present in constituent assemblies), and it is not subject by any limits found 
in positive law.lxv The constituent assembly avoids the most salient 
shortcomings present in the three approaches considered previously.  As a 
mechanism for the exercise of constituent power, it allows the citizenry to 
approach the constitutional regime as radically open, susceptible to any 
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kind of modification. As an extraordinary body, it is based on a distinction 
between the ordinary legislature and the people, between constituted and 
constituent powers. Finally, its episodical nature facilitates intense popular 
participation in constitutional change: in its more democratic version 
(which I will consider below), it can be triggered by citizens even with the 
opposition of ordinary government. 
 
There are at least two ways in which a constituent assembly can be 
convened. The first is the most common of all, and it is present in several 
constitutional regimes.lxvi It consists of an extraordinary body convened by 
the ordinary representatives for introducing important changes to the 
constitution. Because it is convened by the government and not by the 
electorate, this kind of assembly only provides (from the perspective of the 
citizens) the mere possibility of constitutional re-making through an 
extraordinary and popularly elected body. There is, however, another 
method for convening a constituent assembly. The constituent assembly 
convened ‘from below’, triggered at the initiative of the citizenry as 
opposed to that of the legislature, is a superior mechanism from the 
perspective of democracy and weak constitutionalism. In fact, it alters the 
conception of the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy 
under which most Anglo-American constitutional theorists operate by 
seeing the citizenry as an extra-constitutional power (the constituent 
power) that survives the adoption of a constitution. In that respect, it is 
alien to the traditional conception of constitutionalism, according to which 
a constitution signifies the beginning of the rule of law: the ‘channeling’ 
of constituent power through a settled (and ideally permanent) 
constitutional form.lxvii The popular initiative to convene a constituent 
assembly contradicts all of this. It attributes the people (as the mythical 
creator of the constitution)lxviii, the faculty of re-activating its constituent 
power and becoming the real founder of a radically transformed 
constitutional regime.  
 
This mechanism is about recognizing a power superior to the constitution 
and giving the people, acting outside the ordinary institutions of 
government, the institutional means for exercising it. The convocation of 
such an assembly would be initiated by the collection of a number of 
signatures that could range, say, from 15% to 20% of the electorate.lxix 
After the required number is collected, a referendum would take place in 
which the entire citizenry has the opportunity to decide whether the 
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assembly should be convened. If the majority votes in the affirmative, the 
election of the delegates to the constituent assembly would take place. 
From then on, the assembly would be a sovereign body, independent of 
the ordinary (or constituted) powers of government and would operate 
according to its own rules. It would be authorized to replace the existing 
constitutional regime and create an entirely new one. Its proposals, of 
course, would have to be ratified by the electorate in an additional 
referendum in order to enter into effect. Ironically, this type of mechanism 
is beginning to appear not in the national constitutions of established 
Western liberal democracies but in the recently adopted constitutions of 
several Latin American countries.lxx  
 
When triggered by the citizens themselves, a constituent assembly would 
facilitate the realization of democracy at the level of the fundamental laws 
and would come very close to embody the ideals of democratic openness 
and popular participation. On the one hand, a constituent assembly, as a 
means for the exercise of constituent power, has no competencies and can 
make any change in the constitutional regime, no matter how 
fundamental.lxxi It can even result in the (unlikely) abolishment or 
modification of the rights that make any democratic exercise possible and 
in the alteration of the very amendment formula that provides for its 
convocation, although if it does, it would destroy its very democratic 
legitimacy together with that of the constitutional regime. On the other 
hand, and unlike the constituent assembly convened exclusively by the 
legislature, it recognizes the citizenry as the protagonist of important 
constitutional transformations from beginning to end. For it to be a truly 
open and participatory process, the onus that must be met in order to 
activate the assembly should not be too high. The collection of the 
signatures of less than a fifth of the registered electors seems reasonable in 
this respect. It is true that after the initial stage of the process, a simple 
majority of the electorate can reject the convocation of the constituent 
assembly, but the public discussion about the future of the constitutional 
regime that can take place around these exercises is by itself a valuable 
democratic process.  
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C. THE POPULAR INITIATIVE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION  
 
Any democratic constitutional theory must recommend a participatory 
means to propose and decide on changes that do not involve major 
constitutional overhaul. This is the role that a popular initiative to amend 
the constitution would play in a constitutional regime based in the theory 
of weak constitutionalism: a more participatory version of the ordinary 
amendment process. This mechanism of 'direct democracy' is present in 
several European and Latin American constitutions, as well as in the 
constitutions of several states of the U.S.lxxii It usually works in the 
following way. A group of citizens drafts a proposal for amending the 
constitution and collects the required number of signatures (usually around 
10% to 15% of the registered electors) in order to be able to present the 
proposal to the authorities. Once the proposal is presented and the 
signatures validated, governmental authorities are required to submit it to 
the people for their approval or rejection in a referendum.  If the proposal 
is approved, it immediately becomes part of the constitutional text. The 
legislature is thus bypassed altogether (although in some countries, like 
Uruguay, the legislature can present a counter proposal to be submitted to 
the electorate together with the popular initiative), and the official 
authorities have no choice but to provide the administrative tools that 
allow citizens to exercise their power to change the constitutional text ‘by 
themselves’.lxxiii  
 
Although this mechanism departs from the tradition of top-down, elite-
driven, constitutional change, it does not involve the level of deliberation 
and participation that is present in constituent assemblies. Nevertheless, 
the fact that this kind of mechanism depends on the collection of the 
signatures of a great number of citizens creates the potential of activating 
different sectors of society and promoting public discussion. At the same 
time, however, it is more susceptible to manipulation by state officials or 
private interests than constituent assemblies. For instance, it would be 
relatively easy for a powerful economic actor to collect the required 
number of signatures and then launch a persuasive media campaign in 
order to obtain an affirmative vote in a referendum. Nevertheless, the 
influence of powerful economic actors in popular initiatives should not be 
exaggerated, and must be weighted with the power these actors already 
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have over ordinary legislators, as well as with the fact that this mechanism 
gives the citizenry an additional method for change. The scope of popular 
initiatives would be the same as that of the ordinary amending power. That 
is, they would be used to make those kinds of changes that the citizens 
deem necessary but that do not warrant the convocation of a constituent 
assembly. They would play the role, as John Calhoun once said of the 
amending power in general, of the vis medicatrix of the constitutional 
regime, the power to repair the constitution and not of radically 
transforming it.lxxiv At the same time, they could be used to overrule the 
decisions of the courts regarding the constitutionality of ordinary 
legislation (if the system at hand allows for judicial review), and would 
become especially useful to adopt changes that a legislature would not be 
eager to adopt through the ordinary amendment procedure.  
 
I want to end this final section with a brief comment about referendums. 
Referendums play a central role in popular initiatives to amend the 
constitution and are also present in the constituent assembly convened 
'from below'. Democratic constitutional change, of course, is not 
equivalent to the celebration of a referendum. From a democratic 
perspective referendums are simply insufficient, and the widespread 
assumption that they are an expression of the ultimate sovereignty of the 
people, an exercise of constituent power, is based in an unfortunate 
confusion.lxxv A referendum presents citizens with a set of pre-designed 
alternatives that they cannot change, it does not allow citizens to put into 
question and deliberate about different constitutional provisions, much less 
about the constitutional regime as a whole. Dietrich Conrad expressed this 
clearly when he wrote that the value of a constitutional referendum is 
dubious, since it must be restricted “to a few questions to be answered yes 
or no, since it does not give the people an active part in molding 
constitutional details and is, at its best, more in the nature of an ultimate 
veto power”lxxvi. Moreover, if citizens are asked to vote on a set of 
disparate and complex proposals the referendum might turn into a mere 
‘plebiscitary’ exercise, in which voters simply express against or in favor 
of the government.  A referendum does not guarantee the degree of 
discussion and debate necessary for the maximization of the ideal of 
popular participation either: citizens do not become authors of their 
amended constitution but merely ‘consent’ to the proposed changes. 
Popular referenda can also be manipulated by the media and strong 
executives, they can send mixed messages when the turnout is low, and 
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they do not involve the deliberation present in representative 
assemblies.lxxvii 
 
It is not surprising, then, that referendums have a bad reputation: from 
Napoleon to Hitler, they have been used as a way of legitimating 
authoritarianism and dictatorship.lxxviii  Referendums are risky business, 
but I think they are worth the risk. They are the method through which the 
citizenry controls the work of the delegates elected to draft a new 
constitution or the proposals presented by a group of citizens, the mode in 
which the people decides that the constitutional changes in question are 
‘theirs’. Of course, a referendum unaccompanied by public discussion is 
never a good idea. As Sieyes argued more than two hundred years ago, the 
exercise of popular sovereignty does not take place when people form 
their opinions at home and simply bring them to the voting booth: 
deliberation is essential.lxxix But in a process of constitutional change that 
involves a high degree of popular mobilization and debate, a positive 
referendum result can only add democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, as 
Margaret Canovan has suggested, the added legitimacy “is due not so 
much to the referendum procedure as to the popular mobilization that has 
taken form around it”lxxx. In this sense, referendums are a central, but 
flawed component of any democratic approach to the relationship between 
constitutionalism and democracy. 
 
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
The constitutionalism-democracy debate did not live up to its potential. 
The general approach followed by North-American constitutional 
theorists, exemplified here through the works of Dworkin, Waldron, and 
Ackerman, was characterized by presenting constitutionalism as the 
democratic telos. Even theorists with strong democratic inclinations, like 
Waldron, embarked in a defense of parliamentary supremacy and directed 
their energies to attack judicial review, with the result of moving the 
participation of ordinary citizens in constitutional change to a secondary 
plane.lxxxi  To approach the relationship between constitutionalism and 
democracy from a decidedly democratic perspective, I have argued, is to 
think about the ways in which citizens relate to the constitutional regime. 
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In that sense, the adoption or rejection of judicial review is not as central 
as the possibilities citizens have for proposing and deciding on important 
constitutional transformations. The institution of judicial review of 
legislation, in the context of democracy at the level of the fundamental 
laws, is not a problem as long as it, like every other institution and 
principle, is open to democratic reconsideration. A people might opt -
wrongly but through a democratic process- to experiment with judicial 
review in the same way they might opt to experiment with other 
institutions that suffer from fundamental democratic deficits (notice, 
however, that in contemporary constitutional regimes this is not the case, 
and judicial review presents itself almost as a 'natural' and immutable 
feature of a just society). 
 
Moving beyond the question of the legitimacy of judicial review allows us 
to think about the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy 
in a new light. We are forced to look at the relationship between citizens 
and constitutions, to the means of realizing democracy at the level of the 
fundamental laws, instead of focusing our attention on who should have 
the final word about the meaning of a constitutional provision. This, of 
course, raises the stakes exponentially: constitutional theorists are no 
longer supposed to decide which of two more or less predictive 
institutions should enjoy more power (the judiciary or the legislature), but 
obliged to test their confidence and prejudices about ordinary citizens. In 
other words, the choice becomes that of trusting the political creativity of 
the citizenry and proposing mechanisms to increase popular participation 
in constitutional change, or to openly declare an honest and well 
intentioned fear in giving political power to disorganized multitudes. It is 
an overly political decision that does not sit comfortably with the world of 
constitutions, principles, and reasoned adjudications, but that has the 
potential of producing a new way of thinking about what it means to 
propose a 'democratic constitutional theory' in the 21st century. 
 
The proposals that I have considered here, the constituent assembly 
convened 'from below'  and the popular initiative to amend the 
constitution, are examples, already present in a few constitutional regimes, 
of institutions designed to increase the role of citizens in the production 
and re-production of the laws that govern the state. In the same way, they 
are consistent with weak constitutionalism's insistence in permanently 
open constitutions. The adoption of institutions like these, if they ever 
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become a regular component of the constitutional practice of modern 
states, would signify a profound change from the 18th century tradition of 
looking at “constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them 
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched”lxxxii and a move to a 
conception in which constitutional change appears as the possibility of 
correcting existing injustices, and citizens as democratic constitution-
makers.  
 
                                                
i  In discussing the work of these three authors, my aim is to present an example of three 
different tendencies in contemporary constitutional theory. The first of these tendencies, 
represented in Dworkin's identification of constitutionalism and democracy and his 
emphasis in the content of the constitution is also expressed in Stephen Holmes’ theory of 
constitutional pre-commitment. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON 
THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1997). The second tendency, which I exemplify 
through the work of Waldron and that focus on the counter-majoritarian character of 
judicial review is also more or less present  in the approaches of John Hart Ely, Mark 
Tushnet, and Richard Parker. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (2000); RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: A 
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Kent Roach, stand in a sort of middle ground between the previous two positions, as they 
try to avoid a total rejection of parliamentary supremacy, while at the same time 
defending the institution of judicial review of legislation. See MICHAEL MANDEL, THE 
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION (1994); Peter Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue between 
Courts and Legislatures: Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights isn't such a Bad Thing After 
All, 35 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 75 (1997); KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT 
ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001). Finally, the third 
tendency, represented here in Ackerman's defense of the distinction between people and 
legislature, is also present,  in different degrees, in the work of authors such as Akhil 
Reed Amar and Sanford Levinson. Although these authors make a genuine effort of 
finding ways for a new non-Article V constitutional convention to be convened, they do 
not engage in proposing specific institutional changes for increasing the participation of 
ordinary citizens in the production of the fundamental laws. See Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUMBIA L. 
REV. 457 (1994); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). In 
Canada, Peter Russell has implicitly adopted Ackerman's approach in his analysis of 
Canadian constitutional history. See PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN 
CANADIANS BECOME A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? (1993). 
ii  Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R 217. 
iii  Ibid. at para. 76. It is interesting to note here that the 'political representatives' of the 
province of Quebec did not 'consent' to the 1982 constitutional changes (which among 
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CONSTITUTION 16 (1996). 
xi  Ibid. at 143. 
xii  RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW 
POLITICAL DEBATE 134 (2006) 
xiii DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 10, at 17. 
xiv  MICHELMAN, supra note 7, at 16-18. 
xv  Ibid. 
xvi  “We may better protect equal concern by embedding certain individual rights in a 
constitution that is to be interpreted by judges rather than by elected representatives, and 
then providing that the constitution can be amended only by supermajorities”. Ibid. at 
144. The problem is that this fear of constitutional change is not limited to the protection 
of the political rights and institutions that allow democracy to take place; it extends to the 
entire organization of government and the economy. Thus, when constitutional democrats 
talk about protecting or advancing democracy by a constitution that is difficult to change 
and protects basic democratic rights, they are protecting at the same time the traditional 
liberal system of governance which comes accompanied by a conception of the market as 
a central feature of democratic life. They are also making very difficult more profound 
constitutional transformations that, while protecting and expanding basic democratic 
rights, are incompatible with other aspects of liberal governance whose connection with 
democracy is weak or non-existent. 
xvii   Jeremy Waldron, Can there be a Democratic Jurisprudence?, NYU SCHOOL OF LAW, 
PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER No. 08-35, 1; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT 
SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72 (1996).  
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the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1346, 1388 (2006). 
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Representation and Waldron’s Objection to 
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interpret the equal protection clause as making equality of wealth, or collective ownership 
of productive resources, a constitutional requirement, because that interpretation simply 
does not fit American history of practice, or the rest of the Constitution”. DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 10, at 11. To the extent that there are certain changes that 
are simply out of the scope of a reasonable constitutional interpretation (at least at 
particular historical moments), giving judges the power to expand the constitution, of 
making constitutional principles “grow”, is not equivalent to the ideal of democratic 
openness (of course, even if it were, there would still be an objection based on the 
democratic aspect of democratic openness, since judicial interpretation is very far away 
from being a democratic and participatory exercise). For the limits to “living tree 
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imagine any group or individual with a political force capable of imposing them. See 
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politics”. RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST 
MANIFESTO 113-114 (1994). 
xlii DAHL, supra note 41. 
xliii This distinction is not meant to suggest that democratic governance and democracy at 
the level of the fundamental laws are not related with each other: only the citizenry of a 
strongly democratic polity, accustomed to vigorous democratic debate and participation 
about the content of the ordinary laws, is likely to engage in the democratic reconstitution 
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Wolin, Fugitive Democracy in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL (Seyla Benhabib ed.) (1996). 
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democratically superior alternative to Article V: “Rather than aiming for an Article Five 
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should be accorded constitutional status by the Supreme Court”. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE II: TRANSFORMATIONS 415 (1998). 
xlvi Castoriadis, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, supra note 41, at 275. 
xlvii  This limitations on citizenship are of course unacceptable under today’s standards, but 
one must not forget that until the 20th century women did not have the right to vote in 
many countries, and that it was only a few decades earlier that slavery was abolished in 
some of the world’s ‘oldest democracies’. 
xlviii  Claude Ake, Dangerous Liaisons: The Interface of Globalization and Democracy in 
DEMOCRACY’S VICTORY AND CRISIS 282 (Alex Hadenius, ed.) (1997). It is not clear how 
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liv THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 61 (Jacob Cooke ed.) (1961).  
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part of the legally constituted order, should be understood as a means to exercise 
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132.  In other words,  no constitution can confer constituent power or prescribe the ways 
it is initiated: the constituent subject (the people in a democracy) can (re)determine its 
form of political existence whenever it decides such an action necessary. Ibid. But while 
constituent power activates itself through the making of a fundamental political decision, 
the “further execution and formulation of a political decision reached by the people in an 
unmediated form requires some organization, a procedure, for which the practice of 
modern democracy developed certain practices and customs. These are considered below 
[he goes on to consider (a) the national assembly that drafts and passes constitutional 
legislation; (b) The assembly that drafts constitutional norms followed by a popular vote 
or other express confirmation, direct or indirect, of the drafts by the state citizens with the 
right to vote; (c) constitutional conventions of federal states that are submitted to the 
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its will into law.  
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privatization of state enterprises.  For instance, in 2004, a popular initiative was used to 
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lxxiv  See JOHN CALHOUN, THE WORKS OF JOHN CALHOUN (Richard K. Cralle ed.) (1968). 
There is a body of literature that focuses on the distinction between a constitutional 
amendment and the adoption of a new constitution (which usually is presented in the 
context of an argument in favor of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional 
amendments. That distinction if relevant here, but to consider it would require a new 
paper. See for example, William L. Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power, 
33 HARVARD L. REV. 223 (1920); Schmitt, supra note 60; CARL J. FRIEDRICH, 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE 
AND AMERICA (1950); Walter Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 703 (1980); WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE 
INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION (1993); Gary Jeffrey Jacobson, An Unconstitutional 
Constitution? A Comparative Perspective, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2006). For a recent judicial consideration of the theory of 
unconstitutional amendments in a state of the United States, see Strauss v. Horton, 
_________ (2009), where the Supreme Court of California upheld the constitutional 
prohibition of same-sex marriage. 
lxxv  Consider for example the following statement by Pierre Trudeau, on the 
announcement that nine Canadian Provinces (Quebec excepted) reached an agreement 
regarding the patriation of the constitution and the adoption of and amendment formula): 
“I have only one regret. I put it on record. I will not return to it. I have the regret that we 
have not kept in the amending formula a reference to the ultimate sovereignty of the 
people as could be tested in a referendum”. Cited in GRAHAM FRASER, RENÉ LÉVESQUE 
AND THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS IN POWER 298 (2001). 
lxxvi  Dietrich Conrad, Limitation of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power in 
THE INDIAN YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 403 (1966-1967). 
lxxvii  James Tully, The Unfreedoms of the Moderns in Comparison to their Ideals of 
Constitutional Democracy, THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 65 (March 2002) at 213. 
There is empirical evidence that contradicts the common argument that referendums are 
easily manipulated by strong executives. For example, David Altman has demonstrated 
that in Latin America, referendums convened by the executive have around a 50% 
success rate. See David Altman, Democracia Directa en el Continente Americano: 
¿Autolegitimación Gubernamental o Censura Ciudadana?, POLÍTICA Y GOBIERNO, Vol. 
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